Describing and defining organized crime, in an effort to criminalise and punish it, poses significant theoretical and legal problems. Nonetheless, the Scottish Parliament addressed this issue in the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, in the first such legislative effort in the United Kingdom.
provisions. The analysis is both doctrinal and normative, and raises a number of concerns, centring on scope, necessity and effectiveness. Overall, the provisions are expansive and capture some unproblematic actions; they often duplicate existing law; and their value in addressing this particular type of crime has yet to be established.
B. DEFINING (SERIOUS) ORGANISED CRIME
The precise numbers of organised crime groups identified in 2009 by the Scottish Serious Organised Crime Group Mapping Project (367, to be exact) 3 belies the contested definition and nature of organised crime. Many variants co-exist in the academic, legal and political spheres; 4 the term may imply specific structures, organisations or networks that are involved in criminality, the (illegal) provision of (prohibited) goods or services, or certain types of crime that meet a given level of gravity.
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The widespread popular view of organised crime, exemplified in numerous films and TV shows, mirrors Cressey's work on the Mafia in mid-twentieth century North America, 6 in which he identified strict command structures, fixed hierarchies, and collective norms and identity in such organisations. 7 However, this understanding is not substantiated by contemporary empirical studies, which depict much looser arrangements. 8 So, there has been a shift in the theoretical focus toward the illegality of the activities, and to a more nuanced understanding of the nature and structure of the group or network responsible. 9 For example, Maltz sees organised crime as including four characteristics: violence, corruption, continuity, and variety in the types of criminality engaged in. 10 Hagan points to the provision of "illicit goods that are in public demand", 11 while Levi lays emphasis on the central aim of making a profit. 12 A rather different focus is provided by Finckenauer, who argues that organised crime can only be committed by a criminal organisation, which is an advanced, durable and constant network whose members go beyond single instances of criminality and who view themselves as a criminal organisation. 13 Conceptually and empirically, organised crime may be difficult to distinguish from other types of serious criminality such as terrorism and "white collar" crime. In the first instance, the absence of ideology is key. 14 While there may be a nexus in terms of the personnel involved, 15 for organised crime the only true motivation is profit through the creation, control or maintenance of (illicit) markets, in contrast to terrorism which aims to coerce a government or organisation to act in a particular manner through violence targeting civilians. 16 Moreover, though it has been argued that organised crime and white collar crime are interwoven and may be indistinguishable, 17 the latter is described as an "abuse of a legitimate occupational role which is regulated by law". 18 Thus the status or position of the actor involved is critical. In addition, white collar crime is not underpinned by the use or threat of violence.
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Attempts to translate the imprecise concept of organised crime into law are fraught with difficulty. In the UK, Scotland alone has introduced legislation providing for substantive organised crime offences, despite the Home Office recommendation in 2004 of the criminalisation of organised crime as an enterprise in itself. 20 The Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 defines "serious organised crime" and creates a number of substantive offences based on this. 21 This can be described as focusing on the "what" rather than the "who" of organised crime, 22 and contrasts with the approach of the United Nations and the European Union, which centres on the group or organisation involved 23 and which has been adopted in the Republic of Ireland, for example. 24 The focus in Scotland on the crime rather than on the organisation is notable, given that organised crime usually is seen as distinctive because of the nature of its structure, and because of features like the entity's endurance, cooperation and resort to violence.
In Scotland, "serious organised crime" is defined as crime involving two or more persons acting together for the principal purpose of committing or conspiring to commit a serious offence or a series of such. 25 Here a "serious offence" means an indictable offence committed with the intention of obtaining a material benefit, or an act or threat of violence made with the intention of obtaining such benefit in future. 26 Thus, the definition is framed very broadly and may involve just two people, in contrast to the sociological and criminological understanding of organised crime as a group activity.
It is questionable whether just two individuals in fact can commit organised crime, given its commonly understood structure and form. In the first instance, the constituent notions of durability and continuity that are highlighted in scholarship on organised crime 27 are unlikely to be evident when considering the actions of just two people. One of the distinguishing and most concerning dimensions of organised crime is that it can persist despite changes in personnel or withdrawal of individual involvement. The absence of one person will not usually frustrate the plans, indicating the robustness of such organisations. This is not reflected in the Scottish definition.
(Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007), rather than on legislation against organised crime specifically. See text accompanying n 55 below. 21 For an examination of "lower levels" of organised crime see P Stelfox, "Policing lower levels of organised crime in England and Wales" (1998) accurately, in operational and practical terms it is understandable why a broader approach has been adopted.
As noted above, the 2010 Act takes a "serious offence" to mean an indictable offence committed with the intention of obtaining a material benefit, or an act or threat of violence made with the intention of obtaining such benefit in future. 32 Again, this may be contrasted with the EU definition, which requires the offence only to be punishable by at least four years' imprisonment. 33 Of course, this focus on the length of sentence is at best a contingent choice, and may even be viewed as arbitrary, as a legislative amendment relating to sentencing would alter the inclusion of certain offences and thus the definition of organised crime. So, the Scottish definition is to be preferred for its focus on the nature and elements of the criminality. In addition, this definition is more limited insofar as it requires the intention of generating a benefit, which approaches Levi's conception of organised crime as involving profit. 34 There is no reference in the 2010 Act to any specific substantive offences akin to the "disorganized" 37 , or comprises groups assembled on a short-term basis for specific projects from a pool of professional criminals in a certain area.
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The definition in the 2010 Act echoes to a large extent the proposal in a 2009 Scottish Government strategy document, although there serious organised crime was deemed to involve "control, planning and use of specialist resources". 39 There are no such conditions in the 2010
Act. While inclusion would mean that the legislative definition approaches more precisely the accepted theoretical understanding of organised crime, this would, of course, make the behaviour more difficult to prosecute. Furthermore, when the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland)
Bill was debated, a Stage 2 amendment was tabled, seeking to require that the "crime" in the definition be "reasonably … regarded as being both serious and organised". 40 Despite the logic of this suggestion, it was rejected on the basis that apparently minor or trivial activities "often form part of a more insidious picture". 41 While this attempt to capture what appears to be less serious behaviour is understandable as regards crime control, ultimately it means that criminality of an entirely different extent and nature may fall within the definition. Moreover, it dilutes the notion of organised crime to such an extent as to render it meaningless analytically and indistinguishable from other forms of joint criminality. This is exemplified by the fact that the definition of serious organised crime encompasses two people working together to commit a robbery. Admittedly, this is not a minor offence: nonetheless it is difficult to view this as organised crime as commonly understood and as warranting equivalent opprobrium, notwithstanding the conceptual latitude of the term as outlined above.
Building on this notion of serious organised crime, the 2010 Act introduced a number of substantive offences, including involvement in, direction of, and failure to report serious organised crime. In terms of sentencing, other offences may be aggravated by connection with serious organised crime. These legislative provisions will be described and analysed in turn, and their scope, necessity, effectiveness and use to date will be assessed. Taken as a whole, it will be suggested that the provisions are overly expansive, are of questionable necessity, and may not be effective in combatting organised crime. 
C. INVOLVEMENT IN SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME
Section 28 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 makes it an offence to agree with at least one other person to become involved in serious organised crime, and this is punishable on indictment by up to ten years in prison. Not only may a mere two people be involved, the agreement need not pertain to criminality: involvement includes agreeing to do something that may not itself be illegal, if the person knows, suspects, or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that so acting will enable or further the commission of serious organised crime. 42 Thus, the person need not intend to be or become involved in serious organised crime, and an objective standard may satisfy the mens rea of this inchoate offence.
Surely, the definition should require both intention to be involved in serious organised crime and also knowledge that the act will or is likely to further such criminality. Otherwise, its scope is so broad as to criminalise a huge swathe of otherwise unproblematic actions. For example, section 28 could encompass a mother who agrees to buy a mobile phone for her adult child who is involved in drug dealing, and who will use the phone to arrange meetings with fellow dealers, if it is determined that the mother ought to have known the phone would be so used. More contentiously still, it could apply to someone who drives two friends into town where the latter are planning to shoplift. Though these suggestions may seem ludicrous, they fall legitimately within the scope of this organised crime provision if knowledge or suspicion is imputed.
Besides concerns about the reach of the definition, it is questionable whether a discrete statutory offence is required at all, given the ability to prosecute under the common law offence of conspiracy. When this very point was raised prior to enactment, 43 the primary justification given for the new, separate provision was to improve the likelihood of securing of a conviction, on the basis that involvement in a specific offence needs to be proved for conspiracy. 44 Moreover, while the Lord Advocate accepted that "with creativity" conspiracy could be used to 42 That crime is constituted by an agreement of two or more person to further or achieve a criminal purpose. A criminal purpose is one which if attempted or achieved by action on the part of an individual would itself constitute a crime by the law of Scotland. It is the criminality of the purpose and not the result which may or may not follow from the execution of the purpose which makes the crime a criminal conspiracy.
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In this respect section 28 certainly is easier to satisfy insofar as the agreement there may pertain to something legal that facilitates or enable serious organised crime. Nonetheless, the statutory provision is akin to the common law offence, in terms of its focus on the purpose and not the result, and so in this respect the charges are comparable.
While Sir Gerald Gordon observed in 1967 that charges of conspiracy were uncommon in Conspiracy indictments are often long and complicated, in that they charge the conspirator with conspiracy to do X, and of doing Y and Z in pursuance of that conspiracy.
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While this practice has been described as "somewhat regrettable", as something that may cause confusion to juries, 60 and as "arguably prejudicial", 61 it is not incompetent. 62 It is unclear whether the new statutory offence will remedy this matter of complexity, as it is likely that a person would be charged with involvement and with agreeing to do something to enable serious organised crime. However, an individual may be acquitted of conspiracy yet be convicted of any subheads which are themselves crimes. 63 This presumably would be mirrored in practice regarding the section 28 offence of involvement, though this is yet to be evidenced. There is no available report on the one prosecution for this offence, which occurred in 2011. 64 Overall, the presentation of the case is likely to be lengthy and multifaceted. This is unlikely to be remedied in the cases relating to section 28, given the necessity of establishing the nature of the relationship and the purpose of the agreement. investigations, where undercover police officers or "covert human intelligence sources" (CHIS) are likely to be used, 67 and so the agreement may be with one person who never truly agreed or intended to commit the act or carry out the design. It is unclear in Scots common law whether an agreement, in the sense that is needed for conspiracy, can be said to exist if one of the parties is an undercover officer. 68 Thus, the equivalent question in relation to the statutory provision is whether a person may be convicted of involvement in serious organised crime for agreeing to do something with a CHIS. Section 28 makes no reference to such matters. Here it is suggested that section 28 could be satisfied by an "agreement" with a CHIS where the latter agreed to do something which is not illegal, as true agreement could be proven, but this remains to be seen in jurisprudence. It is regrettable that the legislation did not make provision for this, to remedy an existing lacuna.
A key danger in relation to covert human intelligence sources is the encouragement of criminality 69 and the resultant possibility of entrapment which would be likely to breach Art 6.
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Of course, there is no substantive defence of entrapment in Scotland; a prosecution based on entrapment is an abuse of process and should not proceed. 71 Such a plea was refused in Jones and Brown v HM Advocate, a case concerning conspiracy to extort money based on the return of a da Vinci painting, stolen from the Duke of Buccleuch. 72 Here, the police were deemed not to have "crossed the boundary between causing an offence to be committed and providing an opportunity for the appellants to commit an offence". 73 Operationally, this may prove a difficult line to tread in terms of the involvement offence, and it remains to be seen whether this hinders the use of the section in court.
Though section 28 replicates conspiracy to an extent, it also extends criminal liability in some respects. Understandably, prosecutors and police practitioners welcome such extension to encompass those on the peripheries of organised crime, to ensure there is no evasion of responsibility. On the other hand, section 28 raises concerns about the scope of culpability through its application to legal acts. The wide definition catches a range of behaviours that will never be prosecuted and which indeed may not be culpable, and in doing so undermines the legitimacy of the criminal law. Moreover, the involvement offence does not remedy the concerns of Levi and Smith who criticised conspiracy law and practice for its inability to contemplate the activities of a multi-faceted criminal enterprise, and for its focus on a particular agreement and thus its difficulty in identifying sub-conspiracies. 74 This is due to the fact that section 28 remains focused on the individual, and on a certain agreement. Thus, in addition to the concerns raised about its breadth, it is questionable whether this provision will be effective in addressing serious organised crime.
D. DIRECTING SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME
Directing serious organised crime is another separate substantive offence introduced by the 2010 Though one could argue that section 30 has clearer parameters and therefore improves on the common law concept of incitement, it is in essence a duplication of existing law, though specifically in relation to serious organised crime. Even accepting this, its enactment may be understandable in a symbolic sense. The name of the offence is important for accurate labelling, 83 and to convey moral opprobrium through its acknowledgment of the gravity of the behaviour.
In addition to such issues about the necessity of the direction offence, its effectiveness is also can be committed only in relation to a specific offence which a person is directed or incited to commit, so there must be a direct link to criminal action. Therefore it is unclear how this offence would enable the conviction of someone who maintains a distance from such actions. Indeed, the provision has been used just once in a prosecution, 84 so it remains to be seen whether, and if so how, effective it will be in addressing organised crime.
E. EVIDENCE MATTERS
This section considers the applicability of evidential rules to these two new offences. The most fundamental aspect of complex organised crime trials concerns the nature and admissibility of evidence. Even if criminality is detected and particular suspects are identified, testimony against organised criminals is very difficult to obtain, and witness intimidation is a live issue; thus communications surveillance and covert sources become central to successful prosecutions. 85 This issue becomes even more pronounced when those in the upper layer of an organisation refrain from direct perpetration of criminal actions. In an attempt to remedy this, some jurisdictions' legislation on criminal organisations makes some key changes to evidence and trial format. For example, in the Republic of Ireland, opinion evidence of any police officer (or former officer) is admissible in relation to the existence of a particular criminal organisation. 86 In addition, trials for offences relating to criminal organisations in Ireland are held in the juryless Special Criminal Court, on the basis that the ordinary courts are deemed to be inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order. 87 Despite the particular issues that may arise in relation to proving the perpetration of serious organised crime, there has been no alteration of the rules of evidence or criminal procedure in relation to the direction or involvement offences under the Criminal Justice and
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. The Act does not prescribe any particular form of trial, and so the usual mode of jury trial takes place. 88 Nor does the Act alter evidential rules in any way.
Thus, the conventional rules apply relating to the admissibility of evidence, 89 In Hamill, Hamill and his fellow conspirator Gemmill were alleged to be acting together in pursuance of a common criminal purpose, namely an enterprise for the supplying of heroin.
Gemmill made a number of statements about Hamill's involvement, including a directly incriminatory statement mentioning Hamill's name in relation to the supply of drugs. The rule permitting the admissibility of such evidence was held to apply, as there was a common purpose to supply drugs. 95 Nonetheless, the court noted that there was no authority to justify extending the principle beyond cases of common criminal purpose. So, Hamill suggests that indictments for the statutory serious organised crime offences that involve a common purpose will facilitate the admissibility of evidence that would otherwise be regarded as hearsay. Of course, despite the pragmatic desire on the part of the State to include such evidence given its value in cases relating to organised crime, the usual concerns about hearsay and its credibility apply in this instance.
Nonetheless, Johnston v HM Advocate imposes some parameters by indicating that this exception to the hearsay rule does not apply to statements made after the common purpose has been achieved or has failed.
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F. FAILURE TO REPORT SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME
In addition to the new crimes of involvement and direction, failure to report serious organised crime has now been criminalised. Section 31 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 makes it an offence to fail to report to a police constable one's knowledge or suspicion that another person is involved in or directs serious organised crime. This is a crime of omission, and so runs counter to the standard imposition of liability in Scots criminal law, which provides that, in general, one cannot commit a crime by failing to act or to prevent harm. example. In addition, section 31 makes no reference to children, and so it appears the teenage child of a suspected criminal falls within the scope of this provision and could be prosecuted.
That being said, subsection (4) provides that is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 31 to prove that he or she had a reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure.
Surely the age of the individual, the nature of the relationship, and any potential imbalance of power would be taken into account at this juncture.
It is questionable whether this offence will be effective in addressing organised crime in
Scotland.
There have yet to be any prosecutions, though of course, the deterrent effect of the law cannot be discerned and may well influence professionals to come forward with information when previously they would not have done so. Moreover, to be fair, the prospect of overzealous use by prosecutors is not likely, not least due to resource constraints. preferable to have more tightly defined law than to rely on agents of the State to use these powers in a responsible and restrained manner. There may be a civic responsibility and moral duty "to assist the law in achieving its proper purposes" 101 and, of course, it would be preferable for people to report all suspicions and knowledge regarding serious organised crime to the police. Having said that, the imposition of a criminal sanction for not so assisting is questionable in terms of individual autonomy, and in terms of fairness to individuals who may be intimidated and connected to the offending party. 102 Moreover, the breadth of this novel offence may undermine the perceived legitimacy of the law.
G. OFFENCES AGGRAVATED BY CONNECTION WITH SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME
In addition to these three substantive provisions of involvement, direction and failure to report, section 29 provides that an offence may be aggravated by a connection with serious organised crime if the offender was motivated wholly or partially by the aim of committing or conspiring to commit serious organised crime, whether or not he in fact enabled himself or another person to commit such a crime. Where this aggravation is libelled and proved it must be taken into account by the court in determining the appropriate sentence, and the court must state on conviction that the offence was so aggravated and the difference in sentence had there been no such connection.
This provision has been used on a number of occasions, in relation to offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, 103 money laundering offences 104 and international economic migration fraud. 105 The desire for robust sentences is exemplified by Lord Uist's statement that "Organised crime in this country must be suppressed by the imposition of severe sentences on those who are convicted of crimes connected with it". 106 Organised criminals are viewed as rational and motivated by profit, and so as likely to be responsive to deterrent sentences.
Moreover, robust sentences involve both instrumental and expressive aspects. Such sentences are incapacitative and retributive and thereby are directed at the individual and future offenders, but also communicate moral censure on behalf of and to the wider community. The articulation in court as to the cause for aggravation underlines the expressive dimension of this legislative provision.
Nonetheless, section 29 is superfluous and unnecessary, given that group criminality and other factors relating to serious offences like conspiracy to commit drug trafficking offences, for example, are likely to aggravate the sentence anyway. Moreover, it is dubious whether this section will indeed have a deterrent effect: empirical evidence suggests the likelihood and speed of imposition of sentence is of more influence than its length in terms of deterrence. cases particularly. 110 Of course, success is determined by how we define it, and prosecution and conviction rates are not the only yardsticks. The symbolic function of these offence labels is crucial, 111 and this may be a welcome development in itself. As Kenny MacAskill noted, this legislation sends the message that society takes organised crime extremely seriously. 112 This point is made to the community at large, with the State denouncing organised crime in a cathartic criminalisation: the fact that something is being done is seen as gratifying. 113 The Act is also a statement to prospective and current offenders and those facilitators on the periphery: it is hoped, by the specific criminalisation in addition to aggravation at sentence, to underline the gravity of serious organised crime and thereby deter them from involvement. Overall, it is likely that these provisions will have at least some degree of impact on organised crime groups in Scotland, if only in forcing alterations to the way they operate and organise their activities.
** This paper is a draft; a final version will appear in volume 18(2) of the Edinburgh Law
